Not Your Father's Islamist TV: Changing Programming on Hizbullah's al-Manar by Baylouny, Anne Marie
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2009
Not Your Father's Islamist TV: Changing
Programming on Hizbullah's al-Manar
Baylouny, Anne Marie
"Not Your Father's Islamist TV: Changing Programming on Hizbullah's al-Manar," Arab Media &
Society (Issue 9, Fall 2009). http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=728
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/35594
fromn al SharqAlAwsat
Not Your Father's Islamist TV: Changing Programming on Hizbullah's al-Manar
Issue 9, Fall 2009
By Anne Marie Baylouny
            The image of Islamist media is one of grim old men dictating
extremist and male-centered religious precepts; Hizbullah's al-Manar
television, not just Islamist but also owned by a political party with a
militia, has been equated with broadcasting terrorism and waging
psychological operations against its enemies.[1] Yet much of al-Manar
today is nothing like the picture painted of the station. Classified as
terrorist by the U.S., most topics broadcast have little to do with Hizbullah,
its resistance, Shi'a religious teaching, or the fight against Israel.
 
On Hizbullah’s al-Manar, non-veiled women dominate the airwaves
on many programs. Only a small minority of programs on the television is
religious. Christians regularly participate as experts and audience
members, including priests and bishops, and scientific studies from the
west are used as affirmative demonstrations of how Lebanese need to
change. Problems are discussed in an open-ended, non-authoritative format, and a broad, multi-communal audience
regularly participates. Programming promotes values often considered western, such as individual and human rights,
and non-violence. Television shows tackle domestic violence by patriarchal figures and protest violence in video
games. In a style echoing Oprah, civil society is urged to volunteer and help the disadvantaged, even though this
affects the core of what many assert is Hizbullah's base of legitimacy--its provision of social services.
 
            Hizbullah has had ongoing political alliances with other sects since its entrance into the electoral field in
post-civil war elections, yet in its media in recent years the organization has gone beyond politically pragmatic
moves to affirm its inclusion of alternative communities and sects. The media presentation of other communities
demonstrates to viewers an acceptance of diverse lifestyles and ideas, often highly Westernized, that is
communicated in the sphere of popular media run by Hizbullah members.[2] This change has been taking place
particularly since 2000, but was sped up in the following years. Such programming, diametrically opposed to
popular and Western images of Hizbullah as a terrorist organization and its media as a propaganda outlet for
violence and Shi’a exclusivism, is a result of Hizbullah’s increasing Lebanonization or nationalization. The
organization is becoming more beholden to and embedded with domestic actors than was true of the organization’s
founding some two decades ago, reinforcing its Lebanese character. Al-Manar is a window into these changes, for
some more dramatic and perhaps convincing than the organization’s political statements and alliances. The
television demonstrates Hizbullah’s desire to broaden its support and assure its future domestic legitimacy within the
Lebanese multi-religious community. The extent of the television’s integration of other communities suggests that
the embrace of the multi-confessional nature of the country is not fleeting. Indeed, al-Manar presents to its
constituency the image that a multi-religious community is legitimate, even promoting unveiled Christians as
experts in the intimate zone of family matters.
 
The practice of incorporating multiple perspectives and communities on the television indicates an
acceptance and commitment to a multi-cultural nation, potentially intended to assuage fears that the organization
takes orders from Iran or seeks to establish an Islamic state. Such reassuring messages are increasingly important as
foreign threats and foreign presence disappear from Lebanon, removing the primary raison-d’être of Hizbullah’s
militia. Further, through al-Manar, Hizbullah attempts to demonstrate how the organization addresses issues of
concern throughout Lebanon, particularly among youth and women, in ways that are modern and progressive. In
doing so the organization positions itself at the forefront of Lebanese ideas about the future, securing Hizbullah’s
existence in a peaceful Lebanon. In turn, these messages have profound potential to affect the actions and
expectations of Hizbullah’s constituency.
 
Media messages differ from political speeches and alliances, since media is not merely public but also
popular, and potentially, lasting. It can reach wide segments of society communicating images of society and
behavior that other forums cannot. In other words, the multiple voices and approval of differing perspectives
communicated on al-Manar cannot be easily reversed.[3]
 
            In this article I provide an initial analysis of this change in al-Manar's programming, concentrating on
non-political programs.[4] Before reviewing al-Manar’s human interest profile, I depict the progression of the
television station along with Hizbullah’s changing position in Lebanon. I deal briefly with al-Manar’s political
programming—the news, talk shows and promotional spots. These have changed through the years as Hizbullah has
evolved but are more clearly political and embrace a line close to the organization’s image as defender of Lebanon. I
demonstrate that a substantial amount of al-Manar's current shows and their substance do not fit the common idea of
al-Manar as affirming violence, religious preaching or particularism. They deal with human-interest concerns,
especially women, youth, and community relations, many of which would be topical for Westerners as well.
Research for this article was conducted primarily by watching al-Manar from November-December 2004, May-June
2005, and from October 2007 to the present. The 2004 research was completed with the aid of a researcher; the
author completed the rest. Television from 2007 on was viewed by streaming media over the Internet. Viewing
averaged seven to ten hours a week over the Internet and twenty hours a week in 2005.[5]
 
Lebanonization and Changing Programming
 
Al-Manar, the television affiliated with Hizbullah in Lebanon, mirrors Hizbullah’s stance and projects an
image that the organization foresees as important for its future. Hizbullah, simultaneously an Islamist social
movement, militia, political party, and participant in government, has taken part in political institutions in Lebanon
since the post-civil war elections in 1992.
 
Scholars note the pragmatism of the organization, for example, pointing out how it advocates for its allies,
Christian and non-Hizbullah in elections, and formal alliances.[6] Hizbullah's "Lebanonization," or becoming more
Lebanese than Shi'a, was facilitated by two major events in Hizbullah's history.[7] These events were first, the
decision to enter the 1992 Lebanese elections as a political party, which necessitated a decision to relinquish the goal
of an Islamist state. Second was the withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Lebanon in spring 2000, which
removed the main basis for the organization’s existence. The 2005 removal of the Syrian from Lebanon left
Hizbullah on its own and arguably sped up the nationalization or Lebanonization process.
 
In public relations, no less so than in politics, Hizbullah has proved to be pragmatic. As Hizbullah has
transformed its messages and stance, al-Manar has also. Al-Manar television is the land and satellite station of
Hizbullah. Hizbullah began its television station in 1991 broadcasting locally in Lebanon. Beginning as "resistance
media," a station linked to the fight of Hizbullah against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, al-Manar's start
was politicized and religious. For most of the 1990s, al-Manar concentrated on the fight against Israel. This war
coverage emphasized the need to defeat the enemy and highlighted Hizbullah’s military operations against the
Israeli army. Al-Manar broadcast Hizbullah military operations, covered by al-Manar reporters “embedded” with
them. These episodes showing Israeli troops killed in southern Lebanon were initially shown on al-Manar,[8] and
later picked up and aired on Israeli TV.[9] The station’s psychological campaign “Who’s next?” showed Israeli
casualties with a blank space for future potential soldiers killed by Hizbullah.[10] Al-Manar broadcasted some spots
in Hebrew, aimed at demoralizing the Israelis. Some analysts credit these and other psychological operations with
the withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Lebanon in 2000 by demoralizing the Israelis.[11]
 
In May 2000, al-Manar began transmitting by satellite, as the Israelis withdrew from southern Lebanon. This
withdrawal of a foreign occupier, enemy of Hizbullah, from Lebanese soil, has been viewed as causing an identity
crisis for Hizbullah. Much of the justification for the organization and its militia was fighting Israelis in the
south.[12] Since, the second Palestinian intifada began soon after the withdrawal of the Israelis, the station and
Hizbullah substituted new issues in the short-term. Thus, in the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, al-Manar
devoted 40 percent of its time to coverage of the conflict with Israel.[13] However, as time went on, Hizbullah’s
media developed alternative bases for its attractiveness to Lebanese society beyond its resistance role, while also
retaining that military identity.
 
            Some research on al-Manar during the early 2000s emphasized the station’s identity as a terrorist, dangerous
to the U.S. and Israel, overtly teaching and promoting terrorist techniques and airing anti-Semitic and anti-American
messages.[14] That research formed the basis for world opinion on the station. Jorisch concluded that the station’s
core mission was to promote terror, hatred and radicalism.[15] He found no redemptive value to al-Manar’s coverage;
al-Manar was undiluted propaganda, wholly dictated by its militant funder, Iran. Jorisch maintained that the station
was active in the incitement to violence, providing video instructions of suicide bombing techniques.[16] The U.S.
responded to this information about al-Manar by banning it entirely from U.S. satellite audiences and by listing the
station as a terrorist group. It was also banned in Europe.[17] The station was added to the terrorist exclusion list in
the U.S. in 2004, and in spring 2006 was declared a specially designated global terrorist entity.[18]
 
Yet the dominance of television coverage by military topics and resistance of the enemy began to fade
between 2000 and 2004; the Palestinian cause not long replaced the Israeli-occupation of southern Lebanon for the
station. The present research, taking place from fall of 2004 to present, found no instructional programs for terrorism
or bomb-making on al-Manar, perhaps demonstrating change in the station. Some maintain that the Iraq war caused
Hizbullah to decrease its emphasis on the United States as enemy, and focus on Israel.[19] But even before 2003,
al-Manar had begun targeting a wide audience beyond its core Shi’a constituency.[20] The station reorganized in an
attempt to broaden its appeal while also keeping pace with the party's developing political stance.[21]
 
Indeed, the station was sufficiently diversified so that its programs won awards. At the 8th Cairo Television
and Radio Festival, al-Manar won the most awards of all competitors.[22] By the Syrian pullout in 2005, Hizbullah’s
television was overtly targeting multiple constituencies within Lebanon, proving its Lebanese credentials. One
series, interviewing civil society and media personalities, including Christians and those opposed to Hizbullah and
Syria, was deemed by one author to be a demonstration of Hizbullah’s increasing Lebanonization.[23] Other
observers noted that al-Manar had become more critical and objective in its news talk programs, to order to increase
its viewership and expand its support. For the same reason, interviews began to encompass all the communities and
political ideologies in Lebanon.[24] There was a rise in al-Manar programs geared toward consumers, including
American movies and cartoons, along with a decline in propaganda, others noted.[25] This trend continued up to the
2006 war with Israel. In line with Hizbullah’s attempt to attract other Lebanese communities and especially its
political alliance with a Christian political party, al-Manar aired programs of interest also to the Christian
community, including a popular series on Mary, the mother of Jesus, on al-Manar, a woman revered by Christians
and Muslims alike.[26]
 
In political topics the station maintains its stance as the mantle of the resistance against foreign domination
and the protector of Lebanon, affirming its strength as a party and a militia. However the presentation is more subtle
than that depicted in prior writings on the station. No instructional videos on bomb-making were viewed during the
long research period of this study, and violence against civilians is eschewed. In fact, during some participatory
programs hosts hang up on callers who insist on calling world leaders “dogs,” stating that such language and attacks
on a person are not proper or acceptable (al-mushahideen, 3-7-09). Instead, the host steered the audience to analyze
the policies and compare them to how they fit with international law. Resistance against militaries are another
matter. Al-Manar news highlights Shi’a insurgent activities against the American military in Iraq and the station
affirms Hizbullah’s strength and ability in resisting the Israeli military through documentaries and promotional
spots. News concentrates on topics of interest to Hizbullah, similar to other private stations in Lebanon such as
Hariri’s Future television, but presents such news in a matter-of-fact manner. Hizbullah events are given priority and
talk shows discuss issues of importance to the organization. 
 
Al-Manar currently provides a forum for a diverse range and variety of voices, most uncensored. Hizbullah’s
viewpoint is not the sole one projected. The news and talk shows reiterate that Israel and, to a lesser extent, the
United States, are still at odds with Hizbullah’s program, but this view coexists with programming taking the U.S.
and western social and civil society as a positive model. For an organization beginning life as an exclusive, violent
movement, this opening to diverse points of view is significant. Multiple views demonstrated on different programs
show a broadening of the station, not a forsaking of its original constituency. Programs with progressive and gender-
liberating views coexist with religious programs on personal and family life (ila al-qalb, 2008-present), which,
while not depicting an oppressive view of women’s roles, present the issue more narrowly, from the perspective of
religion and Hizbullah’s traditional constituency. It is not a simple switch. This spectrum of multiple views is
playing out on Hizbullah’s television, and the audience has become similarly diverse.[27] The varied programming
attracts different and new constituencies, and it appears that space is being provided for new perspectives in certain
forums.
 
Firmo-Fontan determined al-Manar to be a substitution channel, not watched constantly but viewed for
particular programs.[28] Increasing numbers of Lebanese noted to me the stray away from the ideological platform
of the party to topics important to Lebanese generally.[29] Some Lebanese and Arabs refuse to watch al-Manar,
rejecting all things religious, and these often watch the Christian-affiliated station LBC. Others are attracted to the
station, citing its good programmes. Some individuals said that the station does air some extreme statements, but
also many good points not found elsewhere. Many Sunni Muslims in Lebanon have differences with the station over
al-Manar’s close relationship with the Shi’a and the Da’wa party in Iraq. Al-Manar appears to be popular in the
Palestinian camps in Lebanon due to its coverage of Palestine and news there. Many Christian constituents of the
Free Patriotic Movement, led by former General Michel Aoun, allied to Hizbullah from early 2006, watched the
station’s news regularly.[30]
 
While the removal of foreigners from Lebanese soil pushed Hizbullah and its media al-Manar into a deeper
reliance onto the Lebanese scene, this orientation was challenged by the 2006 war with Israel, known in Lebanon as
the July war. The resistance and militaristic side of al-Manar was heightened, and the station was used as a tool of
psychological combat and target of war similar to its origins.[31] Both the television station and its web site were the
objects of military attacks by Israelis, government and civilians. Al-Manar was among the first targets hit, and
bombed repeatedly. The station stayed on the air, moving to another (secret) location.
 
Israelis briefly interrupted the broadcast to air their own messages, such as "Your day is coming, coming,
coming" with a drawing of Hizbullah's leader.[32] Another depicted a picture of Nasrallah, Hizbullah's leader, with
"no signal" on top of his face and a message in Arabic, telling members of Hizbullah to watch out.[33] They also
broadcast pictures of Hizbullah's dead on the station.[34] After Israelis used Google Earth to demonstrate the
Hizbullah locations Israel bombed in Lebanon, al-Manar responded similarly, broadcasting Hebrew messages and
using Google Earth to demonstrate potential targets in Israel.[35] Al-Manar launched other public relations
campaigns against the Israelis, and both Hizbullah and foreign observers declared al-Manar a weapon allowing
Hizbullah to win the public relations contest of the war.[36]
 
The 2006 war showed the military value of the television, but its use for this purpose proved temporary. The
end of the 2006 war revealed new challenges. Lebanese backed Hizbullah during the war, but subsequently
questions about the proper place of the organization and its arms in the country surfaced.[37] The television switched
back to predominant human-interest programming, and continues to follow that practice, interrupting the tone of
programming on the occasion of events interpreted as threats to Lebanon, Hizbullah, or the Palestinians, or religious
holidays.
 
Current Programming: Dual Identity of the Television
 
            Like Hizbullah, al-Manar holds a dual nature; it is both a politically-oriented and military-supporting media,
and one airing programs separate from politics and its militia. While Hizbullah has relied upon its military
legitimacy and provision of social services as pillars of its claim to be a crucial organization in Lebanese society,
al-Manar is laying the foundation for Hizbullah’s future beyond sole reliance upon the organization’s military
credentials. Simultaneously, through human-interest programming Hizbullah inserts itself deeper into Lebanese
society by discussing popular issues and presenting forward-looking perspectives.
 
The inclusive, multi-confessional programming on al-Manar does not indicate that the station has
abandoned its fundamental support for Hizbullah; rather, the programming demonstrates a broadening to
encompass other communities and lifestyles without forsaking the key Hizbullah positions of the moment.
 The television reflects the combined political, social, and military goals of Hizbullah, goals that have changed over
time to encompass the views of other communities. The balance of programming depends upon the presence or
absence of threats to Lebanon or Hizbullah. During periods of crisis or military threat, Hizbullah is able to
capitalize upon popular fears and return to emphasizing the importance of its resistance (militia).[38] Such threats
demonstrate the continued need for its military abilities. During these periods, human-interest programming takes a
backseat, although it is still present. In the absence of such threats and once the peak of the crisis has passed,
al-Manar returns to its usual programming, reversing the balance: now the affirmation of the military abilities of
Hizbullah constitutes the smaller portion of airtime.
 
Al-Manar is available throughout the Arab world by satellite, in Lebanon over land, and globally over the
worldwide web. Many polls list al-Manar as one of the top stations in the Middle East, particularly for news on
Palestine. Some estimate ten million viewers tune in to the station, a figure often cited but without attributing a
source.[39] Others simply list al-Manar among the top influential outlets in the Arab world.[40] The top four news
stations, which capture 70-80% of satellite viewers, are often listed as including al-Manar.[41] According to the
Jerusalem Media Communication Center, the majority of Palestinians watch al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, and
al-Manar.[42] Jorisch reports a poll in 2003 that found those in Jordan turned first to al-Manar for news of Palestine
(28%), followed closely by al-Jazeera (27.5%).[43] Audience figures go up in any time of crisis, local or in
Israel/Palestine.
 
Al-Manar's audience increased dramatically during the 2006 war, and the station was viewed as presenting
the most up to the minute information on that war. The television moved from 83rd to 10th watched in the Arab
world during the war, according to Israeli sources.[44] A 2008 Zogby poll puts the viewership of al-Manar at 2% of
the Arab world, which translates to about $10 million. By comparison, al-Arabiya had 9% and one of the most
popular Lebanese stations, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, 3%.[45]
 
Still, the television is reportedly limited in its regional appeal during normal times due to its perceived
character as a Shi’a station. Al-Manar’s has achieved some recognition, winning the 2007 Inquirer Award from the
Thompson Foundation and the British Embassy in Amman for best investigative television report, for a piece on
environmental pollution in Lebanon.[46] Further, the station is credited with spurring Arabs to demand
accountability, performance, and transparency from their own militaries,[47] and forcing a reversal in foreign policy
in the Gulf states during the 2006 war.[48]
 
Funding for the station comes overwhelmingly from Hizbullah, whose main revenue is through such sources
as labor remittances, donations, tithes, funding from Iran, and other income.[49] Al-Manar operates on $15 million
annually.[50] Al-Manar relies little on advertising, similar to many other Arab and Lebanese media, although
commercials are increasing. The station reportedly turned down 90% of potential advertisers due to their violation of
its standards.[51] Until 2004, ads were broadcast only on the land-based station, not the satellite. Among their
advertisers were big American and European companies. A scandal brought this to the attention of the U.S.
Congress, which accused the companies of aiding terrorism. American and European advertisers subsequently
withdrew their commercials.[52] Currently, ads on al-Manar are few but increasing, and these local-based ads airing
mainly in prime time with a long infomercial program in the mid-morning.
 
Current programming on al-Manar is of two types, one concerned with military and regional enemies and the
other local and multi-communal. Both are participatory, with programs designed to allow the expression of views,
dialogue and interaction. Distinct from al-Jazeera style debates that pit polar opposite positions against each other
and encourage verbal fighting, on al-Manar the forums entail learning and searching for solutions, not fights for the
sake of drama. The first type of program is consistent with the ideological worldview of Hizbullah. It promotes pride
in Islam, Islamic history, Shi'ism, the Islamic resistance (Hizbullah's militia activities), resistance against hegemonic
powers, and highlights injustices done to Arabs. This programming directly connects with movement goals, and
resembles the coverage discussed exclusively in previous writings on the station. Military campaigns, the conflict
with Israel, and the threatening role of the United States in the Arab region are all included in this segment of
programming.[53] During a crisis in Lebanon or the Palestinian territories, the station switches to a programming
mode familiar to the West as 24-7 coverage, as al-Manar focuses the vast majority of news and programming on the
crisis. Other programs are sidelined until the crisis ends, and audience call-in participation programs increase
dramatically as viewers express their frustration and opinions. In normal times, the station's programming, including
the news, is overwhelmingly geared toward the local Lebanese audience and its issues, far removed from war, Israel,
and the United States.
 
 
            The second type of programming deals with particular population groups and their problems, generally
unrelated to the grand vision traditionally attributed to Hizbullah. This programming focuses on youth, women,
middle class issues mainly but also those of the struggling ordinary, lower class person, what in Arabic is called
tabaqa al-dunya (the phrase implies a lack of means). The bulk of programs focus on the educated middle class.
Individual and sub-group issues and rights are emphasized, validated and discussed, and options for solutions
provided. No one solution is given; this is not a directed lecture but participation, a two-way conversation. Experts,
knowledge, opinion polls, scientific findings, and audiences are all remarkably mixed and divorced from an
"Islamic" context. Often only the hosts--or more often, hostesses--of the programs are dressed in line with Islamic
norms. Experts are often Christian, many expressions are specifically American ("quality time," thinking "outside
the box"), and audiences are heavily female, unveiled, young, and from all Lebanese sects. Other programs are
popular entertainment series similar to soap operas, nature and history programs, game shows and children’s
programs. Together, these form the bulk of al-Manar’s airtime.
 
            In general, al-Manar's news communicates the political point of view held by Hizbullah. Its news, spots, and
some documentaries emphasize the mistakes and threatening actions of Israel and the United States, clearly
depicting the enemy as Israel sometimes including the United States as Israel's enabler. Yet outside of these
instances, programs concentrate on domestic issues of concern to Lebanese in general, and women and youth in
particular. Religion is not emphasized except on religious programs, a few songs, some episodes of children's shows,
and during religious occasions such as the holy month of Ramadan or Ashura. Statements and speeches by
Hizbullah's leader Hassan Nasrallah are covered. Apart from news highlighting events pertinent to the Shi'a
community, the main difference setting the station apart from others is their spots of varying length celebrating the
Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah's militia fighting Israel, and the overt denunciation in these spots of US and Israeli
hegemony. In comparison with overall Arab media environment, al-Manar’s views may not be extremely out of
step.[54]
 
 Al-Manar daily schedule begins in the morning with a program on the Quran and morning prayers, together
one and a half hours. The station broadcasts an hour news bulletin followed by sabah al-manar (Manar's morning)
at 9am, an hour and a half program devoted to family, health, and other issues of concern to women or the primary
caretaker. A news talk show follows, then an infomercial type program (Amana Care), the news, and a news talk
show are aired between 10am and 4:30pm. In the late afternoon, a program for children is broadcast, then a program
on health, the news, and the evening's programs. A brief news bulletin (about four minutes) is aired about every half
hour. Programs for the evening change by day and as new programs are introduced. Travel, historical, science and
nature programs, and soap operas are fillers. Many programs are re-broadcast at night. Many programs are live,
averaging four or five hours daily, including the morning program for women. Women host thirteen out of 24
programs, including news talk shows, in addition to two more that have both male and female hosts. The female
hosts are hard-hitting and assertive, interrupting and cutting off guests and callers, including sheikhs. In addition, the
face of Hizbullah's international English language program is female.
 
Numerous programs parallel western public broadcasting such as PBS. This includes scientific interviews on
meteors and geology, new technology from the U.S., and “Discovery”-style programs on animals, including some
targeted toward the needs of the agricultural segment of the audience (such as new cow-milking technology for
example). Others discuss history, architecture, and nature. The programs are not local, but Western with voice-over.
They are not censored. Men and women dressed in styles that contravene current Islamic norms are shown as is.
Many historical programs focus on Arab topics, examining places, art, and architecture in the Islamic and Arab
worlds. Programs acting out historical events are often aired. As elsewhere in the Arab world, popular series are
historical or have political importance, such as the Syrian bab al-hara (The neighborhood gate).[55] Soap operas also
air uncensored. Romantic series from Egypt, the Gulf, and Syria depict men and women's love and family problems.
The women, veiled or not, appear as in the original soap, and a significant amount of the soap operas contain
unveiled and scantily-clad women. One racy series is set in a hospital. Children’s programs resemble public
television elsewhere in the world. There are cartoons, computer-generated “Teletubbies”-style shows, and puppet
shows that warn about the dangers of smoking.
 
 
New Perspectives and a Multi-confessional Audience
 
            Through al-Manar, Hizbullah is building a new image of itself and projecting this to its constituency and new
audiences. In[AB1] this vision, Hizbullah is not only modern, but future-oriented, multi-cultural, and progressive,[56]
and the programs on the television bear such an image. Al-Manar communicates a sphere of debate that specifically
marginalizes political cleavages and discussions in favor of general problems common across religions and political
parties. Further, the programs project a view of life that appears to contradict Hizbullah and its interests, quite
surprising given the image of the station is a propaganda front for Hizbullah. Al-Manar caters to and reflects a wide
range of audience of religions and lifestyles, and has successfully attracted at least some of these broad
constituencies as participants on the station.
 
            Non-political programming includes shows centered on youth, women, and community issues, which I
describe here.[57] Al-Manar airs programs for women, such as sabah al-manar (Manar's morning), mushkila wa rai'
(Problem and opinion), and wijhat nathr (Point of view); programs for youth, taht al-ashreen, now 'ashreenat
(Under twenty; changed to Twenties in 2008) and shebab (Youth); and community and civil society programs such
as safahat mulawanna (Multi-color magazine), a variety show, and ya'ishouna baynana (They live among us)
spotlighting the disadvantaged. Sabah al-manar, a daily program, is geared toward women's issues, discussing
health problems, how food should be handled and meat cooked, how people can get the medicine they need, how to
mix work with family, legal issues of female equality in Lebanon, senility and problems of the elderly, how to deal
with fear, and parents' expression of anger. Mushkila wa rai' and wijhat nathr are weekly shows focusing on
women's and family issues. Wijhat nathr turned political in its focus. The new “Youth” program took its spot.
Mushkila wa rai' is a long-standing show, taking problems submitted by the audience each week and demonstrating
them in a dramatic skit. Experts, audience members and callers share their opinions on how to solve the situation.
The various youth programs deal with issues of young people such as driving recklessly, violence against children,
male authority, creativity, and inventions by youth. Safahat mulawanna is a variety show that spotlights art, plays,
and other achievements of the community, only rarely are these connected to Hizbullah's resistance, Israel or the
United States. Ya'ishouna baynana spotlights individuals and families living in extremely difficult circumstances in
Lebanon, explores how they could be helped, and the ways society needs to change to prevent such situations.
 
            The community of participants on these al-Manar programs crosses religious divides. The participants and
subjects of the programs, from experts to guests, include Muslims and Christians. A priest handicapped as the result
of being kidnapped during the civil war was the expert guest on one program, discussing a disabled person's
situation, and a bishop was the guest on another program. Female guest experts, audience members and callers are
not only regularly non-veiled, but are often Christian (in one case the professor could hardly speak Arabic but kept
speaking in French and the hostess translated). In one program, out of 29 episodes for which I recorded data on
guest dress, 57% were unveiled women in Western dress, 11% were veiled, and 33% were men. Often, the only one
veiled on stage was the hostess. Seven percent were sheikhs, who appeared particularly during programs that pushed
the boundaries, such as adoption, men contributing to housework, societal restrictions and stereotypes of divorced
women, and violence in the family. A substantial number of these unveiled women and many men were Christian,
apparent either by their names or language use. Some were unable to express concepts except in French (in one case
the professor could hardly speak Arabic but the hostess translated from the French).[58] The audience and callers
mirror this pattern. For one program, half of audiences were consistently non-veiled. In mushkila wa rai', Problem
and opinion, a skit is acted out to illustrate the problem for that week, brought by a viewer. The skits show veiled
and non-veiled women. In another example, a Christian man working in the non-profit sector brought a problem to
the station, indicating that different religious communities are more than guests, audience, and callers to al-Manar,
they also turn to this Shi'a-owned station for help. The constituency is not only multi-communal, but international as
well.
 
The multi-communal atmosphere of Lebanon, a country intensely globalized in the ideational realm, is
reflected in the norms and values proposed in al-Manar’s non-political programming. Indeed, the ideas
communicated in the non-news programming bear striking resemblance to those promoted by the United States and
the West generally. Far from positing an alternative vision of modernity from an Islamist point of view, in most
issues Western knowledge, idioms, and solutions dominate the discussion. The reputed xenophobia of Hizbullah to
the West, or at least its animosity to the United States, is nowhere to be found. American scientific studies are used
as proof and to demonstrate points, and individual rights are emphasized. This ranges from the benefits of modern
western education with its emphasis on creativity to the need for civil society to care for the disadvantaged including
women at risk for domestic violence. Family relations are subject to new norms, as women are assumed to be
educated and working. On these programs, men need to participate in household chores and encourage women the
way women do for men. Like Western think tanks and Western government policies, al-Manar focuses particular
attention to women, youth, and civil society. The multi-communal aspects of the station runs counter to the
Lebanese trend of media promoting the sponsor’s sect group.[59]
 
While al-Manar is global in reach, through the Internet and satellite, many of these programs are live and
clearly depict the concerns and audience of Lebanon. However, viewers participate internationally, even bringing
topics to discuss, not only expatriates but also individuals with no connection to Lebanon. Participants hail from
Yemen, the Gulf, and Lebanese expatriates in the United States and Europe. Yet the solutions and perspectives aired
on these programs give the distinct flavor of Lebanon or a community comfortable and accepting of current Western
ideas. For example, one program expressed that determining what styles and amount of dress for women qualifies as
provocative depends on what the society is accustomed to, while another brought up the possibility of stay-at-home
dads instead of mothers.
 
            Sectarianism, or the promotion of one sect, its politics or religion, is sidelined. In religion, an ecumenical
view is dominant outside the few specifically religious shows. Far from hate speech against Jews, several programs
discuss the common, positive, values of the Semitic religions, specifically stated as such, which encompasses
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (for example, ya’shouna baynana, 11/5/08). Christian religious authorities appear
on the programs. One program was set at a Bishop's house in southern Lebanon, and a priest was the guest speaker
on another. Shi'a religious authorities are careful to use terms available to all the monotheistic religions, speaking of
God in general and not any one religion's precepts. Religion is not generally depicted as the solution to problems.
Hosts ignore the few comments contending that religious practices are the solution, suggested by the audience or
callers. In one case, an audience member stated that memorizing the Quran was a solution to the day's question,
which focused on raising the self-esteem and confidence for all family members (wijhat nathr, 10/7/07). The hostess
interrupted and did not repeat the question to the guest to answer. "Never mind," she stated, and moved on to ask the
guests another question. During the same show, a caller attempted to remind the audience of the need to confront
Israel and the needs of the nation, and the hostess cut him off. An attempt is made to differentiate between religion
and country, between Jews, Judaism, and Israel. Further, the station tries to eliminate negative ad hominem
comments, although due to the live nature of many programs it is not always able to do so. In the program ma`
al-mushahideen (With the viewers), people call in and express their feelings and opinions on a particular subject. On
one, a viewer called a leader of Israel a dog, to which the host replied that was not appropriate language, that they
were discussing issues, and that he would be cut off if he persisted. He persisted and was cut off with apologies from
the host regarding such language (3/7/09).
 
            Others programs put aside political differences, as in 'ashreenat's introduction of a young woman who had
created a project to promote dialogue in Lebanon (12/13/08). "Not March 14th or March 8th," the announcer stated,
but any day in March, referring to the government-supporting coalition (March 14th) versus the opposition (March
8th) of which Hizbullah is a member. Hizbullah's politics are vehemently against the March 14th coalition, but this
woman's project cut across the two and aimed at establishing a national dialogue. Some programs are meant to heal
sectarian divides, as after the confrontation in May 2008 between opposition, mainly Shi'a and pro-government
(primarily Sunni and Druze) armed groups. Programs brought mixed couples to discuss how they were coping and
how the Lebanese could begin to heal from this. In one, the host stated that we all made mistakes in this conflict,
some more than others, but now we were beginning to patch up the wounds and learn from what happened
(5/20/08). Repeatedly, if guests promote one side's politics, particularly if they laud the political stance of Hizbullah,
the host interrupts and reminded them that politics are to be kept out of this forum. Political confessionalism is
depicted as negative. Instead, political battles that do not conflate religion or race with political stance are to be
emulated. The American elections were referenced repeatedly in this respect, as guests discussed the positive
example of how politics is run in the United States on numerous programs.
 
            Education, creativity, and an orientation toward the future are themes running through the various programs.
Arab education is decried for relying on rote memorization and failing to encourage creativity and critical thinking,
just as academics, NGOs, and USAID complain. Creativity and innovation were the subject of shebab (11/6/08).
Young Arab inventors and artists from various parts of the Arab world discussed the importance of free-thinking.
American business models were lauded, from Kentucky Fried Chicken to Walt Disney, and Edison's numerous
failures and ultimate success held up as an exemplar of perseverance. Guests stated that what needs to change is a
mentality that resists creativity and new ideas, along with governments that do not encourage, or work against,
innovation. A female artist (unveiled) discussed her problems being taken seriously as a woman, and her desire to
express what women experience. So important is creativity that coverage of innovations and new practices form the
bulk of the weekly program "Twenties" ('ashreenat) and the weekly safahat mulawanna. Episodes of 'ashreenat
cover the latest, cutting edge gadgets and technological advances, such as a yoga mat with built-in streaming video
and mp3 speakers, and profile successful youth or those proposing new projects. Advances in robots appear
regularly, and green or environmentally-friendly advances are reported with admiration. Street plays against war by
young Lebanese youth are highlighted.
 
            To accomplish the goal of innovation, the value of time and planning were the subject of another episode of
"Youth" (11/13/08), simultaneously discarding concepts of fate that have been interpreted as resignation. The notion
of al-rabbaniyya, or relying on God for the future, was rejected as not useful or valid. The result may be up to God,
but the person has to do his duty, working, planning, and creatively imagining new futures. The management of
time, a quintessential enterprise of modernity, was emphasized as necessary for success and direction.
 
            By itself, the modern mind-set of the station, imparting a belief and duty for people to creatively alter their
world for the better, would be unexpected given common views of Islamism or political Islam. Shows on al-Manar
do not stop there, but also take on patriarchy and promote an ideal of working women and male responsibility for
household chores. Change from tradition is a strong theme. Tradition is viewed as negative, something to be
changed, and was directly confronted in segments dealing with male authority, marriage as oppression, views of
divorced women, men doing housework, domestic violence including honor crimes, countering the norm of silence
against abuse, and choosing a spouse (3/17/08-10/13/08). In all these, the views presented did not differ extremely
from those promoted by the West. Killing a woman because she was raped or committed adultery (honor crimes) is
condemned, as is domestic violence against women and children. Divorced women should not be viewed with
suspicion or seen as loose, and women should be free to stay single and not marry. In many of the more
controversial episodes, those breaking traditional barriers, a religious cleric was either a guest on the show or called
for his opinion. In all cases, the cleric affirmed what the experts had stated and did not contradict the tone or
conclusions of the episodes, thus adding the stamp of religious legitimacy to new ideas.
 
            Common knowledge and inherited understandings are subjected to scientific findings in order to educate for
change. Western countries are lauded for safe houses for battered women, creativity-inspiring education, and the
strong role of civil society. Hostesses discuss needing to "think outside the box," stated in English and translated into
Arabic, and the importance of quality time. Women as caretakers are not assumed. A hostess was careful to correct a
guest and instead use gender-neutral terms. Whoever prepares the food, be it the lady or the man of the house,
should know how to handle meat properly, the hostess stated, as opposed to assuming a woman would always do the
cooking.
 
The programs promote more equitable distribution of responsibility and tasks among all family members, not
limited to women only taking care of the family and home. This includes more responsibility for men in the family,
from chores and child caretaking to encouraging wives in their careers. Relationships within the family between
parents and children have become subject to new norms for the optimum relationship between individuals. The goal
and the role of the parent on these programs are to treat each child equally and obtain compliance without the
traditional stick of force. Further, parents should promote creativity and self-worth for all family members, including
the elderly. Each one needs to feel affirmed, valued, and celebrated, and their individual talent encouraged. Parents
should not project their own lack of accomplishment or their own goals onto their children, but let them choose their
own path. Work is also seen as fulfillment for women, an outlet for her to have a separate source of self-esteem.
When a woman had a rebellion problem with her children, the first thing the guest experts wanted to know was if
she had her own life and work (mushkila wa rai', 2/4/08). Without a separate life away from home, the woman could
feel empty and unfulfilled, and thus place her life expectations onto the children, which would be negative.
 
 
            Another program discussed silence (negative silence, al-samat al-salbi) about domestic abuse and rape
(wijhat nathr, 4/10/08). Eastern culture, stigmatizing a woman for crimes committed against her, was explicitly
condemned in favor of Western practices. “In this, an Eastern country, if you breathe in the north,” an unveiled
woman stated, “they are listening in the south.” Civil society, aiding women in the west, was hailed as the answer
but was lacking in Lebanon. Other countries have safe houses as a solution, here she stays oppressed, another stated.
Having a profession or at least a job and being financially independent are advocated as solutions for women. When
a caller stated that we in Lebanon should not be subject to the norms of other people's cultures and need to stick to
our own, especially since Lebanon's culture is under attack, he was ignored entirely (wijhat nathr, 2/28/08) and the
discussion continued seemingly uninterrupted.
 
            Individual rights and social responsibility are promoted, while violence is rejected. Numerous programs
discuss rights for women and children, using the language of human rights and even the international posters
delineating the rights (in French). Violence in the family and society against children (by teachers) is condemned.
The law, civil society, and knowledge are viewed as the solution, following and obeying the law is important but
civil society needs to identify and lobby against violations of rights and the use of violence. Hosts discuss the rights
of women in Lebanese law, and state that women must fight tradition for their rights. Women's rights organizations
are profiled, and warning signs of abuse discussed ('ashreenat, 4/11/08).
 
The rights of youth against their families are acknowledged, and children are asked what they want from
their parents that they do not receive. Many answered respect and trust (wijhat nathr, 4/3/08), including a young
unveiled woman who acknowledged the parents may be concerned because she is a woman and unveiled, but she
wants her own freedom. Social responsibility and volunteerism are promoted, encouraging the audience to help
themselves and each other. Programs advocate community solutions for problems typically viewed as generating the
bulk of Hizbullah's legitimacy--Hizbullah's monopoly of social aid for much of the Lebanese population. Programs
criticize the government's lack of social services and inform the audience how to obtain aid or medicine from
government institutions.
 
            Much of the programming is self-critical, ranging from criticism of current practices and tradition to
leadership in the Arab world. In one case, mediating a dialogue between loyalists of Fatah and those of Hamas, the
host countered a statement blaming Israel by stating, “OK, we know that is the enemy, but what about the other side,
the Arab states? What about their responsibility?” The host then asked people what they wanted from the Arab states
(qadaya al-nas, 12/2/08).
 
            A few examples illustrate the popularity and relevance of topics on this part of al-Manar, and their distance
from directly supporting Hizbullah’s militia, politics, or perspectives often considered typical of Islamism. One
episode of the program “20s” (ashreenat, 4/11/08) dealt with violence, primarily within the family. The guests were
three (unveiled) young women from a woman’s rights organization. The hostesses were three (veiled) young
women. Violence was depicted as violence against women, children, and even verbal violence. The laws were
scrutinized and criticized: domestic violence must be punished, but here there is no law for it one woman stated. Yet
all Semitic religions prohibit such violence, they said. The example of a man hitting his wife because she did
something he did not approve was mentioned, and one of the women guests discussed the necessity of recognizing
that he did something wrong. There are reasons for it, he can have a weak character or his family treated him that
way, but there are programs to change such behavior. Statistics from the United States on violence were mentioned,
not as a demonstration of the negative American community, but as a general example of how much violence is
probably occurring in the family, since that goes unreported often in Lebanon, and can occur in society. Violence on
television and its harmful effects was discussed, as was Internet and game violence.
 
            In another program, Youth (shebab, 11/6/08), an episode highlighted creativity and its importance. This
program brings four young adults who are successful in their fields from around the Arab world, usually with a mix
of men and women. The host, a young man, asks questions and moderates a discussion among them. This episode
had three young men and one (unveiled) young woman. The Arab world does not encourage innovation, a guest
stated, and people do not invest in Arab projects. One guest had a project for sports, while another was an artist.
Examples of successful investment and creativity in the United States were offered as positive role models that the
Arab world does not follow: Walt Disney, Rambo, and Kentucky Fried Chicken’s business model. The artist
discussed how creativity differs from high grades in school. The host asked what the role of government in
supporting these should be. The mentality in the Arab world and the politics of governments needs to change, one
guest stated, and others agreed.
 
            Another program, geared often toward women’s issues, discussed the common practice of spanking children
in the Arab world (wijhat nathr, 2/28/08). This program is live, with a studio audience, guest experts, and callers.
The program includes a segment interviewing people on the street on the topic of the episode. (In this episode
children were asked their experiences of being disciplined by their parents.) The guest expert (an unveiled woman)
on this program continued to drift into French, generally a sign of a Christian Lebanese upbringing. The audience
was almost completely women, roughly evenly split between veiled and non-veiled, including Christians and
Muslims (demonstrated by the names), working and stay at home mothers. All agreed they should find alternatives
to spanking, but were frustrated how they could still discipline their children. A caller decried the entire discussion,
seeking alternatives to spanking, saying that especially at this time of cultural onslaught we Easterners and Lebanese
should stick to our culture. He was referring to the common idea that spanking was an Arab way of parenting, while
not to do so was Western. He completely ignored by the women in the audience and hostess; the women in the
audience enthusiastically picked up the conversation precisely where it had stopped before the caller, as if he had
never spoken, jumping in and passing the microphone among the audience to state their opinions and situations,
seeking another way of disciplining children. A stay-at-home mother stated that work had nothing to do with it—she
could not discipline her children and she was home with them all the time. Alternative methods of disciplining and
detecting root causes for children’s behavior were discussed.
 
The new message of al-Manar
 
            Bombed and banned, only the news and blustering rhetoric of al-Manar have drawn attention. Unnoticed are
the numerous human-interest programs and their content. The human-interest and non-religious programming of
al-Manar signals and reinforces the organization’s embrace not merely of the multi-confessional nature of the
country, but the legitimacy of alternative lifestyles, an orientation far from its origin over two decades ago, calling
for an Islamic state. The change in programming, from al-Manar's origins to today, was caused by Hizbullah’s view
of a future for itself among Lebanon’s communities, a vision it is communicating and affirming through the station.
Static depictions of Hizbullah and its media, continuing to associate Hizbullah’s often-fiery foreign policy speeches
with its policies and plans toward the domestic community, miss these important changes. Al-Manar reveals the
far-sighted intention of Hizbullah to establish a life in Lebanon beyond its military legitimacy, promoting audiences
and allowing space for discussions popular with Lebanese outside Hizbullah’s core constituency. Particularly
interesting is the focus on social groups deemed important for the future (youth) and those typically targeted by
Western policies (women). Yet this is not a case of conflict over messages to these groups, with Hizbullah spouting a
line diverging from the West. Instead, the content of these programs generally align with current Western and
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